Demographic Aspects of Changes in the Soviet Pension System by Scherbov, S. et al.
Demographic Aspects of Changes in 
the Soviet Pension System
Scherbov, S., Keyfitz, N., Lutz, W., Prinz, C. and 
Wils, A.B.
IIASA Working Paper
WP-90-003
April 1990 
Scherbov, S., Keyfitz, N., Lutz, W., Prinz, C. and Wils, A.B. (1990) Demographic Aspects of Changes in the Soviet Pension 
System. IIASA Working Paper. WP-90-003 Copyright © 1990 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/3448/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
Working Paper 
Demographic Aspects of Changes 
in the Soviet Pension System 
Sergei Scherbov 
Nathan Keyfitz 
Wolfgang Lutz 
Christopher Prinz 
Anne Wils 
WP-90-003 
April 1990 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis A-2361 Laxenburg Austria 
Telephone: (0 22 36) 715 21  t 0 Telex: 079 137 iiasa a Telefax: (0  22 36) 71313 
Demographic Aspects of Changes 
in the Soviet Pension System 
Sergei Scherbov 
Nathan Keyfitz 
Wolfgang Lutz 
Christopher Prinz 
Anne Wils 
WP-90-003 
April 1990 
Working Papers are interim reports on work of the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis and have received only limited review. Views or opinions expressed 
herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute or of its National Member 
Organizations. 
EIIIASA International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis A-2361 Laxenburg Austria Telephone: (0 22 36) 715 21  t 0 Telex: 079 137 iiasa a Telefax: (0  22 36) 71313 
FOREWORD 
The Population Program has taken special interest in those features and problems that 
are common to all social and economic systems, whether they be socialist or free enter- 
prise. Of these perhaps the most important is the aging of populations with the decline of 
birth and death rates. No arrangement of the production process however ingenious or 
however humane can avoid the effects of population aging; yet aging will show different 
faces in different economic arrangements. 
Aging shows itself most directly where the old are provided for by a specific social securi- 
ty tax. If the tax is fixed at  a level just sufficient to provide for a growing population 
then it will be too low when the population ceases to grow; sooner or later there will have 
to be a painful raising of the tax if the old are to be provided with the same benefits. 
Where the old age pensions are paid out of general receipts of the state then the effect of 
aging is partly hidden. It may be covered by reduction of other state expenses, by defer- 
ral of maintenance of infrastructure, and in other ways. Both the United States and the 
USSR show how such deferral can prevent the recognition of budgetary imbalances. 
Demographers have something of the role of accountants in presenting real costs, whether 
of aging or other population change. Their task is to  foresee and announce the bad news 
of aging. 
They also recognize that what is bad news for the state financing arrangements is good 
news for the individuals who benefit by living longer than earlier generations did. Their 
longer lives are in part due to medical services provided by society; should they not work 
for a t  least part of their extended survivorship so as to  repay their medical costs and 
prevent themselves from being a burden? That is partly a question of ethics and personal 
preference with which demographers do not deal; they note only that in all countries 
workers today tend to retire younger rather than older. Whereas the very notion of re- 
tirement was unknown until a century ago - people worked as long as they were physical- 
ly able - now retirement is sought as soon as possible, and for the most part by charges 
placed on the succeeding generation. And this despite the fact that people are healthy for 
more years, and most modern work does not require strong bodies anyhow. 
The larger question is to find a compromise, acceptable to all generations, taking account 
of the wish to  retire on the one hand, and the health of the economy on the other. The 
data and analysis of this paper aim to make a contribution to  this overarching problem. 
Nathan Keyfitz 
Leader 
Population Program 
ABSTRACT 
The paper discusses the consequences of possible demographic changes in the USSR as a 
whole and at the regional level upon the pension system under different assumptions 
about retirement ages. Some general recommendations on changes in the pension system 
based on international experience are presented. 
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DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF CHANGES 
IN THE SOVIET PENSION SYSTEM 
Sergei Scherbov, Nathan Keyjitz,  Wolfgang Lutz, 
Christopher Prinz and Anne Wils 
1. Introduction 
Following the visit of a Soviet government delegation headed by Deputy 
Prime Minister N. Laverov, IIASA's Population Program was invited to provide 
statistical material on population dynamics in the Soviet Union that would be 
relevant for a restructuring of the pension system. 
The material given in this paper provides some rough information on antici- 
pated trends in the ratios between retired and working people as implied by the 
changing age structure of the population and alternative ages at retirement. This 
work is based on earlier research at IIASA that calculated various demographic 
scenarios for the republics of the Soviet Union up to the year 2050, assuming 
different future trends in fertility and mortality. 
With respect to more specific questions of the currently existing and possibly 
changing Soviet pension system, the value of these data is very limited. Due to 
lack of knowledge of the details of the pension system, we can provide only a 
crude macro perspective. If a further, more detailed analysis is desired, a larger 
project on this topic could be launched by IIASA's Population Program. 
2. Expected Future Changes in the Number of Workers per Pensioner 
in the Republics of the USSR 
Generally speaking, the State revenues in the present Soviet pension system 
flow together into one fund, and State expenditures, for example pensions, are 
paid from this fund. This makes it difficult to determine how much of a worker's 
income or product is actually used to pay for pensions. In general, however, the 
working population is responsible for a country's income or product, and a portion 
of this income is used to pay for pensions. When there are more pensioners than 
workers, the burden of these pensioners on the workers increases. A rough esti- 
mation of this burden is the retirement ratio: the number of workers per retired 
person. 
Real figures on the number of workers per retired person are difficult to ob- 
tain because some old people work part-time and some young people take a 
number of years off from work, etc. A fair estimation of the retirement ratio is to 
take the ratio of the number of people in the official working age (say 20 until le- 
gal retirement age) to the number of people above the legal retirement age; in the 
USSR, retirement age is currently 55 years for women and 60 years for men. This 
assumes that men work an average of 40 years and women 35 years. As can be 
seen in Section 3, we found one estimation of the real average number of years 
worked by men and women in the USSR in 1985 to be 39 years for men and 31 
years for women, and the mean actual age a t  retirement was estimated at  58.4 for 
men and 54.2 for women. This suggests that our calculation of the pension ratio 
in 1989 is a reasonable approximation for the USSR as a whole. However, it is not 
perfect, and there could be considerable deviations in some republics. We will re- 
turn to this later. 
To calculate the future pension ratio we first need a population projection. 
In earlier papers by this group (Scherbov and Lutz 1988)' scenarios were made for 
the USSR population by republic up to the year 2050. A number of different as- 
sumptions were made about possible future developments of the population, each 
resulting in a different population pattern in the USSR. Here we use the results of 
the "convergence scenario" which assumes that fertility and mortality in all USSR 
republics converge at  low fertility (a total fertility rate of 2.1, also called replace- 
ment fertility because the size of one generation will be exactly that of the previ- 
ous) and high life expectancy (72 years for men and 78 years for women) by the 
year 2020. 
Population projection is always prone to error, but for the next 20 years the 
population relevant to the pension system - the group of working people over 20 
years and the group of pensioners - can be projected with near certainty. The 
reason is that all the people who will be at  least 20 years old in the next twenty 
years have already been born, and mortality changes so slowly that we can be fair- 
ly certain as to what will happen to a group of people once they have been born. 
Fertility is more difficult to project, and the population projection becomes less 
certain further in the future. 
Using this population projection, we can calculate the development of the 
pension ratio in the future using a time horizon to 2049. The pension ratio can 
change in two ways. First, the population age structure changes; e.g., as the popu- 
lation ages there are less people of working age per person in retirement age. 
Second, the legal age for retirement changes; e.g., if the age at  retirement in the 
USSR increases from 60 to 65 for men, there will be more people working per pen- 
sioner. Figure 1 shows the development of the working age population and the 
pension age population from 1979, projected until 2049. The working population 
increases from about 132 million to 185 million in 2049. The population in pen- 
sion age increases more quickly. The pension ratio is found by dividing the first 
population by the second. It was a little over 3.2 in 1979, and sank to a bit below 
3 by 1989. In the future, this ratio will continue to decline to about 2. This means 
that the demographic situation in the Soviet Union for the pension system will get 
worse. If everything stays the same - the pension system, the income taz, and 
l~cherbov, S. and W. Lutr (1988) Future Regional Population Patterns in the Soviet Union: Scenarioe to 
the Year 2050. WP-88-101. Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analyehi. 
average income - the State's costs for pensions would increase b y  50% relative to  
income taz revenues. 
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Figure 1. USSR population in working ages, population in pension ages, and pen- 
sion ratio. Historical data from 1979-1989; projected from 1989-2049. 
The second possibility for a pension ratio change is a shift in the pensionable 
age. Figure 2 shows the pension ratio from 1979-2049 using three different retire- 
ment ages. The lowest line with the square boxes shows the change in the pension 
ratio, as in Figure 1, using present retirement ages. The middle line, with the 
stars, shows the retirement ratio if women retire at 60. The ratio in 1989 is 3.65, 
about one-half person higher than the present retirement age. The ratio is about 
one-half person higher than the lowest line throughout the projection period. The 
top line, with the crosses, shows the retirement ratio if women retire at 60 and 
men at 65. In 1989, the retirement ratio would be about 4.4, again one-half per- 
son higher than the line below it, and would decrease gradually to about 3. One 
idea that arises from observing this graph is that the 1989 pension ratio can be 
maintained in the USSR if the pension age is gradually raised by 5 years. 
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Figure 2. Changes in the USSR pension ratio according to three retirement ages, 
projected from 1989-2049. 
3. Distribution by Republics 
The USSR republics are very diverse, and what looks one way for the USSR 
as a whole, may look quite different for individual republics. We were asked 
specifically to make some calculations by republic. The age-structures of the 
republics are very different, and the pension ratios are accordingly varied. Figure 
3 shows the development of the populations in working ages and in retirement 
ages, and the retirement ratio in two extreme cases, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. In 
the Ukraine, the population in working ages in 1989 was about 26 million, in re- 
tirement ages 11 million, and the retirement ratio about 2.4. In Uzbekistan, the 
1989 population in working ages was 8.3 million, in retirement 1.7 million and the 
pension ratio correspondingly high. In the next decades, the working age popula- 
tion of Uzbekistan increases very quickly, while the pension age population grows 
more slowly (reflecting slower population growth in the past). The retirement ra- 
tio in Uzbekistan increases until 2009. Then the population in pension ages begins 
to increase quickly and the pension ratio decreases to almost 3 in 2049. Ultimate- 
ly, if we calculate further, it would stabilize at a level similar to the Ukraine if fer- 
tility and life expectancy in the USSR converge. 
Figures 4 and 5 compare the pension ratios in the Ukraine and Uzbekistan 
using the three different retirement ages also seen in Figure 2 for the whole USSR. 
In 1989, the pension ratio in the Ukraine is much lower than in Uzbekistan. With 
the present retirement ages (bottom line), the pension ratio is about 2.4 in 1989 
and decreases to 1.8. In Uzbekistan by contrast, the pension ratio is 4.9 in 1989. 
It increases for 20 years to 5.5, then decreases quickly to below 3 by 2049 (this is 
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Figure 3. Population in working ages, population in pension ages, and pension ra- 
tio in the Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Historical data from 1979-1989; projections 
from 1989-2049. 
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Figure 4. Changes in the Ukraine pension ratio according to three retirement 
ages, projected from 1989-2049. 
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Figure 5. Changes in Uzbekistan pension ratio according to three retirement ages, 
projected from 1989-2049. 
caused by our assumed drop in fertility and increasing life-expectancy which leads 
to an aging population and a lower retirement ratio). 
A gradual increase in retirement age by 5 years, such as that suggested for 
the USSR as a whole, would result in a slightly better pension ratio in 2019 in the 
Ukraine than in 1989. In Uzbekistan, the situation is completely different. Even 
without a change in the retirement age, the pension ratio improves for another 20 
years. After that, aging proceeds so quickly that the retirement age will not be 
able to change quickly enough without causing disruption. A sliding increase of 
the pension age might be advantageous in the Ukraine and other republics with a re- 
latively old population, but the same increase would destabilize the pension system 
in Uzbekistan and republics with similar population dynamics (Tajikistan, Turk- 
menia, and Kirghizia). 
The figures for the other republics are in the Appendix. They suggest that 
the retirement ratio will decrease from 1989 onward in all republics except Uzbek- 
istan, Turkmenia, Kirghizia, and Tajikistan. In these four republics, it will de- 
crease quickly after 2015. This means that the demographic situation for the pen- 
sion system will get worse for almost every republic, in some of them more quickly 
than others. If the Soviet Union wishes to improve the income of pensioners, it 
should consider that there will be relatively more pensioners to support. Either a 
greater chunk of the State budget would go to pensions, or the State could induce 
other ways to improve pensioners' income, such as promoting saving or invest- 
ment in property, selling bonds, providing part-time jobs, etc. We will return to 
this in Section 5. 
The figures also point out the extent of the variance between republics con- 
cerning the pension ratio. This is shown more clearly in Figure 6, comparing all 
republics in 1989 to 2019. The lowest ratios in 1989 are clearly in Russia, Ukraine, 
Byelorussia, Latvia and Estonia. Middle positions are found, for example, in 
Georgia and Moldavia. Very high pension ratios are found in all the Asian repub- 
lics. These differences persist through time at least until the latest date shown, 
2019. This suggests that there is some reason to  consider diflerentiating the pen- 
sion system by republic. The Appendix shows the same figures with a retirement 
age of 65 for men and 60 for women. 
Should the Soviet Union decide to build a national pension system, we can 
make some approximations which republics would contribute more and which 
would consume more from the general pension fund. We calculate the proportion 
that each republic contributes to the total USSR working-age population. For ex- 
ample, the Ukraine makes up 22% of the total USSR working-age population. We 
then calculate the proportion of each republic's pension-age population to the to- 
tal USSR pension-age population; for example in the Ukraine, it is 25%. If these 
two proportions are the same in a republic, this republic would contribute as 
much to the pension system as it consumes, if labor force participation and pro- 
ductivity were the same in all republics. If the working-age proportion is smaller 
than the retirement-age proportion (as in the Ukraine), the republic would be a 
net consumer and vice versa. The results of this calculation are shown for the 
present retirement age from 1989-2029 in Figure 7. Republics that have negative 
values, sticking out to the left of the zero line are net consumers. The countries 
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Figure 7. Net contributors and net consumers of State pensions, estimated by proportions in total population by republic. 
Left of zero: net consumers; right of zero: net contributors. With present retirement ages. 
with positive values, sticking out to the right of the zero line are net contributors. 
Many of the republics are close to zero, that is, they contribute about as much as 
they consume. The two big consuming republics would be Russia and the 
Ukraine, while the big contributors would be Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The 
net consumption of Russia increases until 2019, while the Ukraine becomes less of 
a net consumer. Uzbekistan increasingly becomes a net contributor until 2019, 
while Kazakhstan becomes a small net contributor the same size as Tajikistan. 
These figures must be interpreted with care. For example, the figures say 
nothing about productivity. It is possible that a republic which would be a net 
consumer by age distribution would be a net contributor because of very high pro- 
ductivity of the working age population. Also, the picture shows results for whole 
republics, emphasizing the large republics. On a per capita basis, the picture 
would look different. The figures also say nothing about real retirement age, which 
could differ considerably from republic to republic. The Appendix shows the same 
figures with a retirement age of 60 for both men and women, and of 65 for men 
and 60 for women. 
4. Interpretation: Some Reasons for Caution and More Information 
Needed 
There were no figures available to us for the average retirement age by 
republic, but there are some indications for the USSR as a whole. The calcula- 
tions above consider only legal retirement age, whereas in reality the people in the 
working force gradually retire. Table 1 shows labor force participation of three 
age groups around the legal retirement age, 55-59, 60-64, and 65+, for males and 
females in 1950 and 1985. There was a remarkable decline in labor force partici- 
pation during these 35 years for both sexes, similar to the development in all Eu- 
ropean countries. 
Table 1. Labor force participation rates in the USSR in 1950 and 1985 for men 
and women, three age groups, 55-59,6044, and 65+. 
Males Females 
Year Total 55-59 60-64 65+ Total 55-59 60-64 65+ 
In 1985, for men five years before legal retirement, 23% are already out of the 
work force, while in the five years after legal retirement, 30% are still working. In 
the oldest age group, a small but not inconsequential minority of 9% are still 
working. For women the situation is similar, shifted five years younger. 
In Table 2, the gradual retirement is reflected in the average age at retire- 
ment for European countries in 1985, and the USSR from 1950 to 1985. The aver- 
age age at retirement departs from the legal age in almost all countries with a 
pension system, sometimes by as much as six years - in Poland and the Nether- 
lands, legal retirement age is 65 for men, but the average age at  retirement is 59.2. 
In those countries with a five year retirement age differential for men and women, 
the actual differences between male and female average retirement is less than 
these five years. In short, the legal age for retirement may serve as a guideline for 
retirement age but, depending how many loopholes exist, reality may depart more 
or less from it. 
Table 2. Legal and estimated actual mean age at  retirement for men and women 
in selected European countries and the USSR, 1950-1985.') 
Legal Mean Age Differences 
Retirement at  Between Legal Age 
Age Retirement and Mean Age 
Males Females Males Females Males- Males Females 
Females 
Austria 65 
Canada (est.) 65 
CSSR (est.) 60 
Finland 65 
France (est .) 60 
FRG 65 
GDR (est.) 65 
Hungary 60 
Italy (est.) 60 
Netherlands (est .) 65 
Poland 65 
USSR 1985 (est.) 60 5 5 
USSR 1970 (est.) 60 5 5 
USSR 1960 (est.) 
USSR 1950 (est.) 
unweighted 
average 62.9 60.0 
'1 Old-age and disability pensions (claimants for disability pensions aged 50 and over) 
In the USSR, in 1950 the average age a t  retirement decreased from 62.7 for 
men and 61.1 for women to  58.6 and 54.5 respectively in 1970, and remained vir- 
tually stable until 1985, declining only minimally. It is evident from Table 2 that 
the USSR is the country with the lowest mean age at  retirement of all the Europe- 
an countries shown! 
Not only the average retirement age affects the real pension ratio, but also la- 
bor force participation. In our calculations for the pension ratio above, we impli- 
citly assumed that everyone retires at the legal age and that everyone starts work 
at age 20. That implies men work 40 years and women 35. In fact, labor force 
participation in the USSR is not 10096, and the average number of years worked is 
shorter. As of 1950, the labor force participation trend decreases for men and 
women. We held present labor force participation constant from 1985-2020, and 
calculated how many years an average man or woman would work. 
We also calculated the average number of years that would be worked if re- 
tirement age increased by 5 years in 1995, and the average retirement age became 
equal to this new legal retirement age. The results are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Average number of years worked (AWY) by sex, 1985-2020 (2050). 
Version a: Legal age at retirement: 55 (females) and 60 (males) 
Mean age at retirement: 54.2 (females) and 58.4 (males) 
1985 1990 2000 2010 2020 2050 
Males total 39.16 39.17 38.94 38.31 37.68 37.17 
Females total 30.17 31.26 33.14 33.96 33.98 33.61 
Version b: Legal age at retirement: 60 (females) and 65 (males) 
Mean age at retirement = legal age at retirement 
Males total 39.16 39.17 43.38 43.73 43.57 43.09 
Females total 31.82 32.75 35.86 37.93 38.88 38.64 
With the present mean age at  retirement, the average number of years 
worked for men would decline from 39.16 in 1985 to only 37.68 in 2020 if labor 
force participation would remain constant at  the 1985 level. For women, it would 
increase from 30.17 to 33.98 if labor force participation remains constant. 
If mean age at  retirement suddenly increases in 1995 to 65 for men and 60 for 
women, we would expect that the mean number of years worked would increase 
by the difference between the old average age at retirement and the new one, that 
is 6.6 (65 minus 58.4) years for men and 5.8 (60 minus 54.2) years for women. In 
fact, the average number of years worked increases much less - in our calculations 
it increases by 4.44 years for men and 2.72 years for women in 2000 - because the 
labor force participation in these age groups is not very high. 
These two facts, the discrepancy between legal and average age at retirement, 
and the less than complete labor force participation suggest that if the legal age at 
retirement would be raised by five years in the USSR, the effect might not be as 
great as expected. 
They also suggest that there might be some real differences between the pen- 
sion ratios, as we calculated them above, and the actual situation in each Soviet 
republic. This is especially important if we are to find and analyze the 
differentials and inequalities between the republics. For instance, it could well be 
that the mean age a t  retirement in the more industrialized republics is lower than 
in the other republics, and that the industrialized republics are at  the same time 
those which have a high proportion of elderly from the start. If this is true, it 
would accentuate the variation in the pension ratios of the Soviet republics even 
more than we observed above. 
To find out more about this variation between republics, we need data on la- 
bor force participation rates by republic and sex to calculate the average number 
of years worked by a man or woman before retiring, and to estimate the mean age 
at  retirement. The data for the new retirees per republic, sex and single year age 
group would make the calculation of the mean age at  retirement more precise and 
could improve the calculation of the pension ratios. 
As mentioned above, the pension ratios alone are not enough - there is 
differential productivity in the Soviet republics which might mitigate or even re- 
verse some of the pension ratio differences observed above. The per capita pro- 
ductivity in each republic would help us to make a more precise picture of the 
demographic influence on the pension system in the republics of the USSR. 
5. Some General Thoughts on Alternative Pension Systems: Combining 
State Pensions with Private Savings, Family Support and Continued 
Work Options 
Like many of the other changes needed in the Soviet economy, the transition 
to a new pension system means at  the same time hardship, and is also an oppor- 
tunity to  start anew on sound principles. This means a chance to avoid the mis- 
takes of the past that are now recognized both in the East and West. 
The state pensions in Western Europe and the United States which tax the 
present workers to pay those who are presently in retirement, originated at  a time 
when many young people supported few old people. It was of rather low cost to 
the working people to fully support the old people via a state pension. Presently 
(and in the future) there are far less working people to  support an enormously in- 
creased population of old people. The pension burden (number of working people 
per old person) has increased to such an extent that soon, if all people retire 
around age 60, there will not be enough workers to  support them a t  tolerable tax 
rates if the pensioners do not have other sources of income - saved income in the 
form of bank accounts or life insurance, family community. 
One mistake that has been made by many western countries is the notion 
that state pensions could be the sole support of old people. If state pensions can- 
not carry the whole burden of retirement costs, we suggest that the support sys- 
tem for old people should be a four legged stool: 
1) State pensions; 
2) Private savings; 
3) Family and local community help independent of the state; 
4) Protected sectors of the economy in which old people can work inefficiently, 
but yet making some contribution, and earning some (small) wage - for ex- 
ample, small scale farming, small retail stores, small scale service such as 
repairs. 
The idea behind such a four-tiered system is that one should minimize state 
pension costs to relieve the working population of the burden of paying the pen- 
sions by encouraging the pensioners and the workers to use other ways of increas- 
ing retirement income. 
5.1. State pensions 
State pensions have developed in industrialized western countries since the 
beginning of the century, many of them maturing in the 1950s or 1960s. There is 
a wide range of pension systems in use, including a flat rate minimum pension for 
all, income dependent pensions, a combination of these two, a pay-as-you-go sys- 
tem, and partial investment of workers' pension contributions. 
In general, pensions have become more generous and retirement an accepted 
state. As a result, there are many cases where the old are perfectly fit and pro- 
ductive in the occupation they have been following, and they just want to retire 
sooner than nature dictates. The age of retirement is declining rapidly for male 
workers, and this presents a problem to the economy, especially at  a time when 
the number of births and hence of young recruits is low. We believe that part of 
the cause is the wrong impression that politicians have given of the capacity of the 
system to maintain the old without having to work. In all countries, we need to 
get more information on the realities out to the public. 
The high state pensions also may be correlated with lower savings rates and 
remove the necessity of having children to care for a parent in old age. We sug- 
gest that in general, the state pension should be enough to keep people alive, but 
not enough to discourage saving or make children unnecessary. Beyond that, a 
few further options could be considered. 
From the above, it is clear that higher retirement ages considerably reduce 
the pension burden. Thus we suggest that pensions be sharply graduated upwards 
according to age at retirement. The basic principle ought to be that pensions are 
so low at low retirement ages that healthy individuals will prefer to keep on work- 
ing. It might be that at current prices, those who wish to retire at  age 60 be given 
the current 100 Roubles per month; those who retire at  age 65, 150 Roubles; those 
at age 70, 200 Roubles. Of course, these are only suggestions; perhaps the 
numbers should be doubled given the current inflation. 
A second possibility along these lines is to allow people to receive a portion of 
their pension even if they continue working. In the present system, when a person 
retires the State loses income (previous contributions of the retiree) while expendi- 
tures increase. If people are allowed to receive part of their pension while they 
continue working, this could induce such large numbers of them to keep working 
that the net effect would save the State money. 
It should be recognized that some people will prefer to retire early and live 
very modestly; others will prefer to keep working so that they can live well when 
they retire. Some people will want to save a large part of their incomes while they 
are of working age, while others will want to save little but work to an old age. 
Giving people choices will help satisfy them, and this is all the more necessary 
when there are some difficult times ahead. 
We also propose the choice of taking some years of pension at younger ages 
and working longer later. This takes advantage of the fact that people live longer 
and are in better health than ever in their 60s and 70s, and also boosts the pen- 
sion tax paying morale of the workers because they can enjoy some of the fruits of 
their payments immediately. The "early pension years" could be used to re-train 
people for a new occupation in this time of rapid technical change, or to give ex- 
tended maternity leave or extended educational leave. This would be compensated 
by working longer when others reach the regular age of retirement. 
Another aspect of making the payments of pension taxes more agreeable to 
the workers is to separate this tax from other taxes. In many countries the state 
pension finances are separate from other state institutions. This has the advan- 
tage that people know they are getting something concrete in return for their con- 
tributions. 
Much research already exists on different systems of state pension. If desired, 
an IIASA study could go deeper into the subject and make more concrete propo- 
sals based on the present Soviet pension system. The aim would be to introduce 
as little variation from the present as possible; sudden changes disturb people, and 
one should make the reform as consistent with their expectations as possible. The 
ideal is to remove the objectionable features of the present arrangement but leave 
in place those features that are good or harmless. 
5.2. Private savings 
State pensions can be the basic income in retirement. Private savings can 
supplement it. Every economy requires savings in order that it may invest, and 
the problem is how to encourage this. One of the most obvious ways is stimulating 
people to save for their old age. This saving can be private or collective in the 
form of private or public pension plans which invest the collective savings of all 
contributors. In the past, it has been mostly private savings. In many countries, 
pension insurances are gaining popularity, and in Japan, the state pension scheme 
is so organized that a large fraction of the money paid by the workers is saved and 
invested, to be paid out later, along the principles of private saving. 
High state pensions make individual saving unnecessary for individuals, 
despite their necessity for the community. But an even bigger element discourag- 
ing saving is inflation, especially when markets in industrial equities, real estate, 
etc., are inadequate. Far and away the biggest financial asset of the average 
American family is the ownership of the house or apartment they live in; the sale 
of that asset can help an old person a good deal in his or her later years. This 
could be an increasingly important means of saving in the USSR, especially since 
apartments are also up for sale. 
Sooner or later the present inflation will be brought under control, but in the 
meantime some device is required so that savers will not be punished by inflation. 
One device is indexed government bonds. People would buy bonds, i.e., lend their 
1990 Roubles with the assurance that they would get back on demand the 
equivalent in 1995 or 2025 Roubles. At present rates of inflation, this would mean 
that if they cash in their bonds 10 years later they would get more than twice as 
many of the Roubles then in circulation. The ratio would be worked out in a 
price index weighted according to the commodities used by old people of modest 
incomes. 
It will be asked whether the State can afford to offer such bonds for sale. 
The answer depends on one thing only: the efficiency of the investment and pr+ 
duction processes, e.g., the bonds can be used as mortgage on plants and produc- 
tive operations or against the national economy as a whole. 
The question as to what interest rate should be added for indexed bonds is 
not easy. One answer is no interest at all; we believe that people would buy them 
if they saw them as a safe repository of value, even if the real value would not in- 
crease. But if the investment will produce goods that sell well at then current 
prices, bringing profits of 5% or 10% on the capital invested, then 1% or even 3% 
real return to bondholders may well be afforded. It will be necessary to be fairly 
concrete about the guarantee of repayment, given the known suspiciousness of the 
public regarding the government - common to all countries. 
5.3. Family a n d  local community help 
One has to be careful about relying too much on families to assist parents in 
their old age since the same phenomenon that makes difficulties for state pension 
- low birth rates - also creates difficulties in individual families. Small families 
mean few children to look after parents. Moreover, in all countries - if the USSR 
is not included in these, it soon will be - the children seem to have lost the discip- 
line they had in former times; they want to pursue their own careers and their 
own pleasures; just as having children of their own is a handicap to these, so also 
is having dependent parents. Indeed part of what has motivated state pensions is 
undoubtedly the disinclination of children to be financially responsible for their 
parents. 
Yet children can be an important source of decreasing the social costs of ag- 
ing. Children or the community can take over part of the care of aging parents so 
that these do not need to go to old-age homes, or to expensive hospitals, for exam- 
ple, by caring for them during a temporary illness, doing grocery shopping, or 
heavy housework, etc. 
How can children be encouraged to take responsibility for their aged parents, 
for instance to have them living in the same or nearby premises? We need to in- 
vestigate what privileges will entice children to help parents, perhaps allowing ear- 
lier retirement for a child who has a parent living in his premises. If the size of 
existing dwellings makes this impracticable, then nearby residence could be en- 
couraged instead. 
A part of the task of the Soviet authorities will be to make clear that no feasi- 
ble state social security scheme will do the whole job of ensuring a good living for 
the old people. This also includes non-monetary aspects for which family support 
is of particular importance. 
5.4. Work for the old in protected areas of the economy 
At one time it was the old who were the repository of the community's pro- 
ductive knowledge; that is no longer true in most branches of activity. Technols 
gy is changing too fast in most lines of production. But the capacity of the old to 
learn new technologies is much greater than was believed in former times, when 
there was no need for such learning. We believe that re-training programs are re- 
quired in many activities, and a t  a wide range of ages from 40 to 75. If people can 
be motivated to learn, they will prove unexpectedly adaptable. 
Yet for those old who cannot be so motivated, or who suffer from physical or 
mental limitations, a host of occupations can be found that they can perform per- 
fectly satisfactorily. Everything from night watchman on building sites to raising 
and selling vegetables, to certain kinds of inspection of manufactured products, 
could well take advantage of the diligence and reliability of many old people. 
6. Conclusions 
In sum, the broad concept of social security that we espouse depends on all 
four of the means by which old people can be supported, and not state pensions 
alone. People should be given the option of retiring at  various ages, but the re- 
tirement at  ages as young as 60 should be discouraged by low pensions for these, 
and much higher pensions for those willing to work longer, although certainly a 
prerequisite for this is the availability of enough jobs. Private saving should be 
encouraged, if necessary by indexed bonds, though this is a part of the solution 
only in the long term. Children looking after an aged parent should be offered 
some retirement for themselves. Those who are able to work should be en- 
couraged to do so, either following an introduction to new technology or doing 
simple work. One could investigate the consequences of these various systems in 
the Soviet Republics. 
APPENDIX FIGURES 1-14 
Pension ratio according to three retirement ages by republic: 
Bottom line with squares: women 55, men 60; 
Middle line with crosses: men and women 60; 
Top line with crosses: women 60, men 65. 
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FIGURE A.15. 
Pension raticm by republic in 1989, and projected in 1999,2009, and 2019, according to present retirement ages, 
60 for women and 65 for men. 
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FIGURE A.16. 
Net contributors and net consumers of State pensions, estimated by proportions in total population, by republic. 
Left of zero: net consumers; right of zero: net contributors. Retirement ages 60 for men and women. 
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FIGURE A.17. 
Net contributors and net consumers of State pensions, estimated by proportions in total population, by republic. 
Left of zero: net consumers; right of zero: net contributors. Retirement ages 60 for men and 65 for women. 
